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Government Access
To Documents And
Testimony In Federal
Tax Cases
Accountants As “Third-party” Record
Keepers

By Susan M. Saterfiel

As an incident to accountants’
representation of taxpayers in Inter
nal Revenue Service (IRS) examina
tions, it is necessary to be familiar
with IRS access to books, records,
working papers, and testimony. The
accountant also should be able to
recognize the earmarks of a criminal
investigation so as to refer the client
to an attorney when appropriate.
The IRS can use its summons
power under IRC §7602 to gain ac
cess to books, records, and working
papers regardless of possession by
taxpayers, accountants, or other
third parties. The summons can also
be used to require testimony. Where
specific legal requirements are met,
the IRS can use search warrants to
search and seize tax records and
working papers. After criminal cases
are referred to the Department of
Justice, federal grand juries can use
their subpoena power to require pro
duction of documents and testimony.

where none has been made, or
determining the tax liability of any
person.1 IRS agents routinely carry
summonses with them and sign and
serve them when it is deemed
necessary. The only requirements
for the summons are that its purpose
is for the determination of tax
liability and that the data desired
must be relevant to this purpose. In
United States v. Powell,2 the “four
fold test” for a valid summons was
established: (1) the investigation
must be conducted for a legitimate
purpose; (2) the inquiry should be
relevant to this purpose; (3) the
desired material must not be
possessed by the IRS; and (4) the ad
ministrative steps required by the
IRC must have been followed. The
IRS does not have the power to en
force a valid summons but must seek
an attachment against the sum
moned party from a court.

The Summons

The 1976 Tax Reform Act added
IRC §76093 which provides for
special procedures in the case of
third-party summonses. In general, if
any summons is served on a thirdparty record keeper and such sum
mons requires the production of
records of any person other than that

The IRS obtains its power from
§7602 of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) to examine data, to summon
either the taxpayer or a third party,
and to take relevant testimony for the
purpose of ascertaining the correct
ness of any return, making a return
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Notice Requirements

summoned, then notice of the sum
mons must be given to the person
whose transactions are described in
the records within three days of the
date of service. For the purposes of
IRC §7609, the term “third-party
record keepers” is: (1) any mutual
savings bank or other savings in
stitution chartered and supervised
under Federal or State law, any
bank, or any credit union; (2) any
consumer reporting agency; (3) any
person extending credit through the
use of credit cards or similar
devices; (4) any attorney; and (5) any
accountant. There are several il
lustrative cases involving the defini
tion of the third-party record keeper.
The United States v. Exxon4 case
involved a summons to Exxon for
documents dealing with land being
leased from the taxpayer by Exxon.
The taxpayer tried to intervene by
claiming that Exxon is a third-party
record keeper since it extends credit
through credit cards. The United
States District Court ruled that since
the records summoned were unre
lated to credit activities, Exxon is not
a third-party record keeper for this
situation.
United States V. Desert Palace,
Inc.5 provides another viewpoint.
The IRS ordered the Desert Palace
through a summons to turn over all
records of transactions for a particu
lar taxpayer. No notice was given to
the taxpayer, but upon learning of
the summons, the taxpayer de
manded that the Desert Palace not
comply. The taxpayer argued that
the Desert Palace was a third-party
record keeper and that the summons
was not enforceable since the tax
payer was not given notice. The IRS
said that the Desert Palace was not a
third-party record keeper; however,
the United States District Court ruled
that the Desert Palace was, in fact, a
third-party record keeper due to its
extending credit to customers. The
summons was not upheld since
formal notice was not given to the
taxpayer.
To further clarify the definition of
third-party record keeper, consider
the United States v. White Agency6
case. In this case, the taxpayer was
seeking to intervene in connection
with the summons of employment
and compensation records of the
taxpayer. It was determined by the
IRS that the White Agency was not a
third-party record keeper; therefore,

no notice to the taxpayer was
necessary. The taxpayer argued that
the agency was a broker which is a
third-party record keeper under
§7609 (a) (3) of the IRC. However, the
court ruled that the summons was
directed at the property of the White
Agency. The taxpayer had no signifi
cant protectable interest in such
property. Since the agency was not
acting in its role as broker, it was not
a third-party record keeper. The
court ordered compliance with the
summons. In the 1978 case, United
States v. J. Joseph Gartland, Inc.,7 it
was ruled that a corporation is not a
third-party record keeper as defined
in §7609.
Section 7609 does not apply to
summons if: (1) it is solely to deter
mine the identify of any person hav
ing a numbered account with a bank
or other institution; or (2) it is in aid
of the collection of the liability of any
person against whom an assess
ment has been made or judgment
rendered. A case illustrating this
situation is United States v. Com
monwealth National Bank.8 This
case involved a taxpayer who
argued that a summons had been
given to a third-party record keeper
and he had not been given notice in
accordance with §7609 of the IRC.
However, the court ruled that since
the summons was issued to aid in
the collection of a tax liability from a
person against whom a judgment
has been made, the rule concerning
notice of the taxpayer does not
apply.

Right to Intervene
Section 7609 further grants any
person who is entitled to notice of a
summons the right to intervene in the
enforcement of such summons and
the right to stay compliance if written
notice not to comply is given to the
person summoned and to the IRS
within 14 days. The IRS will then be
prevented from examination of the
summoned documents until a court
order for enforcement is obtained.

The John Doe Summons
Another provision of IRC §7609 is
the use of the John Doe summons. A
John Doe summons is any summons
which does not identify the person
with respect to whose liability the
summons is issued. In United States
v. Bisceglia,9 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the IRS
has the authority to issue a John Doe
summons to a bank or other

depository to discover the identity of
a person who has had bank transac
tions suggesting the possibility of
liability for unpaid taxes. The failure
to have a name on the summons
does not make it unenforceable. To
determine the tax liability of a tax
payer, the IRS requested names and
addresses from the telephone com
pany of three of the telephone num
bers appearing on a taxpayer’s
telephone bill in the 1979 case
United States v. South Central Bell
Telephone Company.10 The Tele
phone Company claimed that there
had been no notice made to the three
subscribers before the delivery of
notice to the third-party. In ruling,
the United States District Court held
that a John Doe summons does not
apply if the subscribers are not
being investigated as to their tax
liability.

Handwriting Exemplars
One question involving the scope
of the IRS summons is the use of the
summons to produce handwriting
samples. There have been conflict
ing rulings over whether §7602 of the
IRC permits the IRS to require a tax
payer to create a document by giv
ing handwriting exemplars.
In United States v. Campbell,11 the
Eighth Circuit Court rules that handwriting exemplars are not
testimonial but are a physical
characteristic of the person. The
Court ruled that §7602 of the IRC of
1954 gives the IRS the authority to
summon handwriting exemplars and
ordered the summons enforced. In
United States v. Rosinsky,the
Fourth Circuit Court ruled that since
under a grand jury subpoena a wit
ness may be compelled to give hand
writing exemplars and since the IRS
power to summon is essentially the
same as the grand jury’s, a summons
to require handwriting exemplars is
valid. However, in the United States
District Court cases of United States
v. Del Sandro13 and United States v.
Lewis,14 the IRS was found not to
have the power to compel handwrit
ing exemplars.
The conflict in the rulings was
resolved by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v.
Euge.15 It was held that Congress
has empowered the IRS to compel
handwriting exemplars under the
summons authority of §7602. The
decision was based upon the fact
that the duty to appear and give

At initial confrontation the
accountant should inquire if a
special agent is involved.

testimony in §7602 has traditionally
included a duty to provide some form
of nontestimonial, physical evi
dence, such as handwriting.

Summons Directed to
Taxpayer’s Accountant
The accountant should recognize
that IRS revenue agents are charged
with civil enforcement and that IRS
special agents are charged with
criminal enforcement. Normally the
accountant cooperates with the IRS
and turns over books, records, and
working papers after obtaining
client approval. If a special agent
appears, however, the accountant
should advise the client to seek legal
counsel. It is important, therefore, for
the accountant to inquire if there is a
special agent involved when initially
confronted by the IRS. In the United
States v. Tweel,16 the accountant
was told that there was not a special
agent on the case. However, the
audit was made at the request of the
Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section of the Department of Justice.
The conviction was reversed due to
an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.
In the Couch v. United States17
case, the accountant was in posses
sion of the taxpayer’s bank state
ments, payroll records, and sales
and expenditure reports. Where the
accountant had the taxpayer’s con
sent, a revenue agent was allowed to
begin an examination of the records.
Upon the revenue agent’s findings, a
special agent was called in to partic
ipate in the investigation. The tax
payer withdrew the permission pre
viously granted, and the special
agent issued a summons to the ac
countant. The Fifth Amendment right
and the accountant-client privilege
were claimed by the taxpayer as
grounds for nonenforcement of the
summons. The Supreme Court ruled
that the Fifth Amendment is not
The Woman CPA, October, 1981/5

Fifth Amendment defense for
the taxpayer has never been
fully explored.

available to the taxpayer when the
summons is given to the accountant
and that state accountant-client
privilege statutes are unavailable in
federal tax investigations.

Summons Directed to
Taxpayer’s Attorney

and closing entries, working papers,
notes, memoranda, and any corre
spondence used in the preparation
of the return. The Circuit Court held
that production of copies of letters
sent by the accountant to the tax
payer would not violate the tax
payer’s privilege against self-in
crimination. However, the Court held
that production of letters sent by the
taxpayer to the accountant and
retrieved from the accountant by the
taxpayer in anticipation of a criminal
tax investigation would violate the
taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment rights.
The Court ruled that the Fifth
Amendment protects against com
pulsory production of papers written
by an accused with respect to one’s
own affairs and presently in one’s
own possession whether or not pre
viously sent to another for the latter’s
retention.
In United States v. Knight,21 the
taxpayer had possession of account
ant’s working papers and asserted
the self-incrimination defense. The
District Court ruled that account
ants’ role in creating documents
place them outside any Fifth Amend
ment privilege. The taxpayer’s
possession of the papers does not
bring them within the privilege.

The leading case involving a sum
mons to the taxpayer’s attorney is
Fisher v. United States.18 The tax
payer was being investigated for
possible civil or criminal liability
under federal income tax laws. After
obtaining certain relevant docu
ments from the accountant, the tax
payer transferred the documents to
the attorney. The IRS issued a sum
mons to the attorney who refused to
surrender the documents on the Defenses to the Summons
grounds of the Fifth Amendment and
Illegal Purpose. The United States
the attorney-client privilege. The v. LaSalle National Bank22 case es
summons was ordered enforced. tablished two nonexclusive require
In the 1976 United States v. ments for enforcement of an IRS
Heiberger19 case, the taxpayer’s law summons: (1) summons must be
yer was also an accountant. The tax issued before the IRS recommends
payer resisted the summons for the to the Department of Justice that a
working papers on the tax return criminal prosecution be undertaken;
since the return was prepared by the and (2) summons authority must be
lawyer and thus privileged. However, used in good-faith pursuit of the con
the court ruled that as far as this gressionally authorized purposes of
case was concerned, the taxpayer §7602. Further, this case pointed out
had consulted the lawyer in the role that before recommendation to the
of accountant. Therefore, attorney Department of Justice, tax fraud
client privilege was not relevant for cases are both civil and criminal.
the summons.
Therefore, the intent of the agent
Taxpayer in Possession
cannot be the measuring stick. The
The question as to whether a tax question as to whether an investiga
payer in possession can use the Fifth tion has solely criminal purposes
Amendment as a defense to non- can be answered only by an ex
compliance with the summons has amination of the “institutional
not been fully explored. In United posture” of the IRS. Those opposing
States v. Beattie,20 the taxpayer was enforcement must bear the burden of
summoned to appear and bring all of disproving the actual existence of a
the working papers prepared by the valid civil tax determination or col
CPA which were used in the prep lection purpose by the IRS. In the
aration of the individual tax return. 1979 case United States v. Chemical
These documents requested in Bank,23 the taxpayer said that the
cluded but were not limited to trial summons was issued to the Chemi
balances, balance sheet, adjusting cal Bank solely for a criminal inves
6/The Woman CPA, October, 1981

tigation. The claim was made due to
the fact that the return was being ex
amined as an independent audit
within the Brooklyn District Internal
Revenue Service Strike Force Pro
gram which is coordinated by the
Department of Justice. The Strike
Force designates the subject to be
audited by the IRS; thereafter, the
IRS is autonomous. The Second Cir
cuit Court ruled that there was no in
dication that the civil liability search
had ended; therefore, the enforce
ment of the summons was ordered.
Holding up of a criminal indictment
against a taxpayer in order for the
IRS to gather information for the FBI
was ruled in United States v. Chase
Manhattan Bank24 to be grounds for
nonenforcement of a summons.
Relevancy. The IRS must show
relevancy between the summons
and the legitimate purpose for the in
vestigation. In the United States v.
Coopers and Lybrand25 case, the tax
return of the corporate taxpayer was
prepared by accounting personnel
within the corporation. However, the
IRS issued summonses to Coopers
and Lybrand for tax accrual files
prepared by the taxpayer and for the
CPA firm’s audit program used in the
audit of the taxpayer. The Tenth Cir
cuit Court held the summonses as
unenforceable on the grounds of
irrelevancy and immateriality to the
determination of the tax liability of
the taxpayer. Further, the case
brought out that if the IRS fails to
show that material is relevant to the
purpose of the investigation, then
the summons is overbroad and
unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The case of United
States v. Matras26 denied enforce
ment to an IRS summons for a tax
payer's budgets. The IRS had re
quested the documents to provide
them with a “road map” for the in
vestigation. The Eighth Circuit Court
ruled that the IRS failed to prove the
relevancy of the budgets and that the
issue of whether budgets are poten
tially relevant to an investigation
must be determined on an ad hoc
basis. Finally, the term “relevance”
was defined to mean more than
“convenience.” The Supreme Court
upheld the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
in California Bankers Association v.
Schultz.27 This act requires financial
institutions to maintain records of
the identities of customers and to
maintain microfilm copies of

customer transactions for use in
criminal, tax, or regulatory inves
tigations. Title II of the Bank Secrecy
Act requires reports of transfer of
more than $5,000 into or outside of
the United States and of domestic
deposits or withdrawals in excess of
$10,000.

The Search Warrant
The utilization of the search war
rant is restricted by the Fourth
Amendment requirements of prob
able cause. The Fourth Amendment
requires that: (1) a search warrant
must be obtained from a neutral and
detached magistrate; (2) evidence
must establish probable cause that a
crime has been committed; (3) the
warrant must describe the place to
be searched and items to be seized;
and (4) there must be a connection
between the item to be seized and
the crime alleged.
In Andreson v. Maryland,28 a sole
practitioner attorney was under
fraud investigation. Investigators
received search warrants to search
the law office to obtain evidence.
Although the bottom of the search
warrant contained the phrase
“together with other fruits, instru
mentalities and evidence of crime at
this time unknown,” the warrant was
not found to be an illegal general
warrant, because the phrase was
referring to a particular real estate
lot.
The Fourth Amendment protection
of corporations was shown by the
G.M. Leasing v. United States29 case.
The warrantless entry and seizure of
books and records was in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. However,
the seizure of automobiles in public
places for collection of taxes was
ruled as not invading privacy and
therefore, such seizure required no
search warrant.

munity the taxpayer’s testimony may
be compelled.
In General Motors v. United
States,30 the Circuit Court ruled that
grand jury subpoenas are not final
decisions for purposes of appeal.
Thus, the Interlocutory Appeals Act
of 1958 which provides appeal rights
from interim or non-final decisions
applies to civil and not to criminal
cases.

Summary And Conclusion
The accountant in tax practice is
often caught between IRS demands
and the client’s desire to resist.
Therefore, it is important to be
familiar with vital aspects of govern
ment procedures relating to pro
duction of documents.
One method of access is through
the IRS summons. The IRS is bound
by the United States v. Powell “four
fold test” of good faith and by the
United States v. LaSalle rule limiting
use of summons after the decision to
prosecute. Further, the IRS must
show relevancy between the sum
mons and the purpose of the inves
tigation.
When the accountant is in posses
sion of the requested documents, the
Fifth Amendment is not available as
a defense against production, and
no accountant-client privilege is re
cognized. When the attorney is in
possession, papers do not achieve a
greater protection than they would
have in the taxpayer’s possession.
The Fifth Amendment may be used
by the taxpayer when the “private
papers” of the taxpayer are involved.
A search warrant is limited by

The Grand Jury
Subpoena
The grand jury deliberates in
secret and is given a wide range of
authority to determine if a criminal
crime has been committed. There
need be no showing of probable
cause and there need be no notice
given to the taxpayer that he is being
examined. Therefore, it is a more
powerful discovery tool than the
summons. The taxpayer’s right to
refuse to answer irrelevant ques
tions is limited and by a grant of im
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Fourth Amendment conditions of
probable cause and is available both
to individuals and to corporations.
The grand jury subpoena need not
show probable cause nor give
notice. As such, it is the most power
ful means of access available.
Accountants should keep abreast
of changes in government access in
order to guide the client through any
civil IRS review process and to refer
the client to counsel at the appropri
ate point.Ω
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